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My first exposure to some of the ideas analyzed in The Calculus of Consent took place in
spring 1963. At that time, I participated in a seminar of Edward Banfield during the months
I spent as a Rockefeller Fellow at Harvard University. Banfield, a well-known political sci-
entist always open to new approaches, had invited three young scholars who worked at the
forefront of what soon became known as public choice theory, namely Anthony Downs,
Lieutenant Mancur Olson, and Gordon Tullock. We seminar participants where highly in-
terested in their presentations, and on all three occasions a lively discussion arose. I had al-
ready used ideas of Downs’s An Economic Theory of Democracy in my habilitation thesis on
Aussenpolitik und internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (Foreign Policy and International
Economic Relations), but the subjects presented by Mancur Olson and Gordon Tullock were
new to me.
No wonder that I soon read The Calculus of Consent. The book impressed me with the
proof that different procedures for making political decisions recommended themselves, de-
pending on the costs of decision-making for the problems to be solved compared to the
disadvantages brought about by excluding members of society from the decision-making
process. However, one of my early students, Malte Faber, now professor at Heidelberg Uni-
versity, found some problems with the result. He analyzed the question whether the as-
sumption of unanimity at the constitutional level always prevented problems in establishing
adequate decision rules at the operational level. He was able to show that in certain cases,
especially when questions of income redistribution are at issue, the unanimity rule at the
constitutional level leads to the establishment of the same rule at the operational level under
plausible conditions. But this means that the approach used by Buchanan and Tullock is
unable to explain income redistribution (Faber 1973).
For my own research, however, it turned out that quite by chance other ideas of the
Calculus gained a bigger influence. When I began to work on my book Grundlagen der
Politischen Ökonomie (Foundations of Political Economy) in the beginning of the 1970s,
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Table 1 A logrolling example
with two issues Building a Theater
yes no
Building a Football Stadium yes 2,2,−6 4,−3,−4
no −1,5,−2 0,0,0
I recalled the statement by Buchanan and Tullock that logrolling might provide certain pro-
tection of minorities: “Note that the results under logrolling and under non-logrolling differ
only if the minority feels more intensely about an issue than the majority. . . . The above
discussion suggests that a reasonably strong ethical case can be made for a certain amount
of vote trading under majority rule” (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 133f.).
Logrolling can be defined as meaning that one minority group supports the favorite
project of another minority in exchange for their support of its own preferred project, though
both do not like the project of the other. Because together they form a majority, they can
succeed with their wishes by helping each other. For instance, if you support my wishes for
building a theater I will support your plans for a football field. I thought that the idea of mi-
nority protection by Buchanan and Tullock was an appealing trait of logrolling and planned
to insert an example of it into Grundlagen der Politischen Ökonomie. Thus I looked for a
simple numerical example with a community comprising three voters like the following (see
Table 1).
The figures represent the utilities of the three voters for each possible outcome of the
vote(s). If the decisions on building a theater and a football stadium are taken separately
and independently, both proposals will be rejected, because the first and the third voter are
better off if no theater is built, and this independently of whether the stadium is voted for
or against. And similarly, the second and the third voter form a majority against building
the football stadium. But the outvoted minorities, namely the second and the first voter,
respectively, have a chance to win if they strike an agreement to exchange votes in the sense
that each of them does not vote only for his own but also for the other’s aim. By doing so,
they increase their utilities from 0 to 2. But as a consequence the third voter faces his worst
outcome with a utility of −6.
So far, so good. Unfortunately I quickly found out that the (yes, yes) outcome is not
stable. For the third voter could offer the second voter a vote for the theater in exchange for
a vote against constructing the stadium. Under this exchange, his utility rises from −6 to
−2, whereas that of the second voter increases from 2 to 5. Alternatively, he could offer to
support voter 1’s bid for the stadium in exchange for a vote against the theater, an outcome
that would be better for both of them. But that is still not the end of the story. Compared
to the asymmetric outcomes in which only one building is funded, the outcome (no, no) is
better for a coalition of the first and third voters, or for a coalition of the second and third
voters, respectively. We thus get two cycles of “social preferences”:
(1) (yes, yes) > (no, no) > (yes, no) > (yes, yes) and
(2) (yes, yes) > (no, no) > (no, yes) > (yes, yes).
“Bad luck,” I thought when I saw this result. “By chance, I must just have taken some
unfortunate numbers for the utilities to produce this cycle.” So I looked for other numbers.
But again the same result occurred, and the same for another example. Then the idea dawned
on me that this might be not by chance but rather a universal result. But how to prove it?
I had no solution. However, my subconscious mind worked on the problem. For when I took
a walk in the snow a few weeks later in Grächen in the mountains of the Valais, where our
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Table 2 General case of
logrolling with two issues Issue One
yes no
Issue Two yes a1, b1, c1 a2, b2, c2
no a3, b3, c3 a4, b4, c4
daughters were skiing, I suddenly had an epiphany about how to solve the problem with
simple mathematics. Let me sketch the proof here (Table 2) for two issues, each with two
alternatives, similar to the numerical example of Table 1, but now generalized.
To make logrolling possible, that is, profitable for two voters, we have to make certain
assumptions concerning their preferences, where P means preferred:
First voter: a3 P a1 P a4 P a2
Second voter: b2 P b1 P b4 P b3
Third voter: c4 P c2 P c3 P c1
In this case it is profitable for the first and the second voter to form a logrolling coalition.
It is easy to see that also in this general case relations (1) and (2) hold. This means that
whenever we have a logrolling situation for two issues with two alternatives, cyclical social
preferences result. This would not change if the logrolling possibilities involved voters 1
and 2 or voters 2 and 3 instead of for voters 1 and 3.
At this point it seems appropriate to explain briefly what I mean by “cyclical social
preferences.” I do not accept the idea that there exist social preferences of a community or
political body comparable to individual preference orderings. Consequently for me cyclical
social preferences just mean that the decisions of a collective body may lead to inconsistent
or contradictory outcomes. This could also mean that the sequence of voting on different
alternatives can be manipulated by a chairman controlling the agenda. Or the result may be
a chance event depending on which pairs of alternatives are voted on in which sequence.
And finally, when all possibilities are voted on in the sequence of time, the former results
may be overturned.
My paper containing the proof of this theorem appeared in Public Choice (Bernholz
1973) but was still limited to two issues. In spring 1974, my family and I accepted an in-
vitation from the Center for Study of Public Choice at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute to
spend a sabbatical semester in Blacksburg. Buchanan and Tullock insisted that I should join
them for the meeting of the Public Choice Society at Yale University in New Haven soon
after our arrival. At the conference, I attended a session of interest to me and was much
surprised when one of the speakers referred to my paper as an important contribution, only
regretting that it was still limited to the case of two issues each with two alternatives. I was
able to report that I had worked out a generalization to n issues each with mn alternatives
(n,mn ≥ 2) which had just appeared in Kyklos (Bernholz 1974).
The problems related to logrolling have never quite left me since that time and have led to
a series of publications over more than two decades. Already at my first stay in Blacksburg I
received letters from a philosopher, Thomas Schwartz, in which he doubted my results and
tried to disprove them by providing counter-examples. In the following exchange of letters
I could convince him that his examples referred only to minority coalitions not bringing
together majorities of voters. After that he became an ardent adherent of the theory and con-
tributed to its further development. He soon published an article (Schwartz 1977) in which
he generalized my results to all other non-dictatorial decision rules, whereas I had only
analyzed qualified majority voting up to near-unanimity besides simple majority voting.
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Table 3 Reading Lady
Chatterley’s Lover Daughter
Read Do not read
Mother Read a1, b1 a2, b2
Do not read a3, b3 a4, b4
Thus his approach also considered other decision rules, including liberalism, i.e., the case in
which issues are decided by different individuals. However, his proof was limited to the case
of separable individual preferences, and his paper also did not make it clear what kinds of
assignments of decision rights were incorporated and what this generalized logrolling the-
orem meant for the corresponding social organization. Subsequently I was able to remove
these gaps (Bernholz 1980; similar results were presented independently by Schwartz 1981;
see also Schwartz 1986), and also to show that the assumptions and results implied a sub-
stantive interpretation of Arrow’s (1963) impossibility result for a finite number of two or
more issues.
The main lines of the further development of my work in this field can best be understood
after mentioning two facts. First, logrolling between two or more parties means nothing else
than a contract to decide issues (in the above example: to vote) in a certain way. Second,
the person(s) outvoted experience a negative externality because of the votes of the others.
Thus, it is not surprising that I could show (Bernholz 1982) that cyclicality is present only if
negative external effects including the negative effects on outvoted people are present. The
latter idea of “politically” caused negative externalities was again an idea already expressed
in The Calculus of Consent (pp. 60ff.).
Now, if the decisive factors causing cyclical social preferences are (a) contracts favoring
participants, and (b) negative externalities, then it is not surprising that the “logrolling”
results could be extended by Schwartz and myself to all other contracts. After all, contracts
are agreed to only if they secure better results for the participants. A simple example showing
this is provided by the so-called paradox of liberalism put forward by Amartya Sen (1970),
presented in Table 3 according to my interpretation. The preferences for daughter and mother
are as follows:
Daughter: a1 P a2 P a3 P a4
Mother: b4 P b2 P b3 P b1
The mother prefers most that both she and her daughter do not read the somewhat lascivious
book. As the next best outcome she prefers that she rather than her daughter reads it. Next in
her preferences is the case that her daughter but not she reads the book. The worst case for
her is if both of them would read the book. The daughter’s preferences favor most the case
in which both read the book and the worst if nobody reads it. But she rather prefers that her
mother alone read it than only she herself does. Obviously she wants to educate her mother
to a more liberal attitude.
Now assume that both have the right to decide whether they themselves read the book
or not. In this case the result would be that the daughter but not the mother reads the story.
But this is not Pareto-optimal, since they would prefer a2 to a3 and b2 to b3, respectively.
As a consequence Sen calls this the Dilemma of a Paretian Liberal, since both mother and
daughter have the liberal right to decide their own affairs. However, in a true liberal society
the two should also have the right to improve their position by concluding a contract. But
if they agree to a contract since it makes them both better off, the Pareto-optimal outcome
(a2, b2) would result. But unfortunately again, cyclical social preferences result, if either
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the daughter or the mother does not honor the contract, similar to the logrolling case. For,
the daughter could read the story because this would lead to a better position for her. And
then the mother could also change her behavior, and so on. Thus, a cycle results. The same
would be the consequence if the mother would first break the contract.
In this example, the negative externality arises because mother and daughter have the
liberal right to decide for themselves on their own behavior, and not from being outvoted
as in the example in which a group has the right to take decisions, for instance by majority
voting. It follows that the problems of cyclical social preferences arise for two reasons:
first, the assignment of rights to different individuals or groups to decide issues and, second,
because in taking those decisions certain rules like majority or unanimity voting, a chance
mechanism, voting by an oligarchy or dictatorship are valid. Note that such decision rules
may also imply or deny rights for members of society.
It should not be surprising that further work started from the assignment of rights to the
members of society and from the decision rules used. My thinking thus followed in a way the
path taken by Buchanan and Tullock in the Calculus. As mentioned above, I had shown that
for the case of two or more issues, each with at least two alternatives, the results implied a
substantive interpretation of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, the theorem taken as meaning
that no non-dictatorial transitive social preference function existed if all possible different
profiles of individual preference functions were considered. Here the expression “profile
of individual preference functions” refers to the set of the preferences of all individuals
in a society. But then Arrow’s approach can be seen as follows: Namely that his analysis
starts from any assignment of rights and decision rules taken as a parameter, and that he
proved starting from this assumption that there existed always at least one combination
of the preferences of all members of society in which intransitive, that is cyclical social
preferences, resulted. Arrow thus took the profiles of individual preferences as a variable.
Having realized this, I thought: “Let’s turn this way of looking at things upside down:
Let’s start from any profile of individual preferences taken as a parameter and examine
whether there always exists at least one assignment of rights to take decisions, and of deci-
sion rules, preventing cyclical social preferences.” If this were the case, the Arrow Paradox
could always be solved or prevented by an adequate assignment of rights, decision rules,
or both. Fortunately, my analysis was successful and I was able to provide the proof for
the most general case (Bernholz 1986). Here I will just illustrate the result for the cases of
Tables 2 and 3. First, consider the following change of assignment of rights in Table 3: The
mother now has the right to decide whether the daughter should read or not Lady Chatter-
ley’s Lover, whereas the daughter gets the right to decide on the reading of the mother. In
this case the Pareto-optimal outcome with a2 and b2 would result.
In Table 2 let us consider first the introduction of the unanimity rule of voting. In this
case the result with ‘no’ for both issues and utilities a4, b4, c4 is the Pareto-optimal out-
come. Again no cycle is present. Another case would be to assign decision rights only to an
oligarchy of the first and the second individuals who decide by majority voting (here equal
to unanimity). In this case both issues will be decided with a ‘yes’ and utilities a1, a2, a3
result. The outcome is again Pareto-optimal.
The proof for the general constitutional possibility theorem given in my paper quoted
above has led to two important additional insights. First, there exists always one purely
liberal assignment of rights (in which case only different individuals have the right to decide
issues) allowing Pareto-optimal outcomes and preventing cycles. However, if the number of
issues is smaller than the number of individuals this would imply a kind of oligarchic pure
liberalism. Second, an assignment of the rights to decide all issues to all members of society
by using simple majority voting does not allow a Pareto-optimal solution without cyclical
social preferences.
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It has been argued (and also been evident to me) that in reality the constitutional assign-
ment of rights to take decisions and of decision rules to prevent Arrow’s Paradox would
require the knowledge of the preference orderings of all individuals. In this sense the consti-
tutional approach taken in my paper was certainly problematic. Thus I tried to find another
solution which started from the realization that the problems leading to cyclical social pref-
erences possibly including Pareto-optimal and Pareto-inferior outcomes with two or more
issues were caused by contracts between several parties. I also recalled that according to
the Coase Theorem the problem of negative externalities could be solved by agreements
among the parties concerned, independently of the assignment of property rights provided
that no transaction costs were present. Moreover, my constitutional approach had shown that
there always exist assignments of rights and non-dictatorial decision rules leading to Pareto-
optimal outcomes and preventing cyclical social preferences. Given these insights, should
it not be possible to reach such outcomes by stepwise bargaining among parties interested
in improving their present positions? Unfortunately the problem proved to be difficult, es-
pecially since Aivazian and Callen (1981) had shown that the Coase Theorem is no longer
valid if more than two parties are involved.
So it took several years until I was able to solve the problem in the form of a general
mathematical proof. I finally succeeded in generalizing the Coase Theorem by introducing
the postulate of binding contracts. For if contracts were binding so that they could not be
broken it was possible to show that by a process of bargaining, moving possibly from con-
tract to contract, it was always possible to reach a stable Pareto-optimal outcome, so that
no cyclical social preferences remained (Bernholz 1997, 1999). The proof also implies the
irrelevance of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and of Sen’s theorem of the Impossibility of
a Paretion Liberal under the conditions stated. For the examples of Tables 1, 2, 3 the valid-
ity of the theorem can be easily shown, since only one contract is involved in these simple
cases.
If the contract between mother and daughter in Table 3 is binding it cannot be broken.
Consequently the cycles are suppressed and the stable Pareto-optimal outcome results. Sim-
ilarly, if in the examples of Tables 1 and 2 the contract between voters 1 and 2 is binding,
no further agreements between voters 1 and 3 or voters 2 and 3 can be concluded, for such
agreements would lead to a violation of the contract by either voter 1 or voter 2, which is
not permitted if it is binding. In reality, of course, it depends on the severity of the sanctions
following a breach of a contract whether it is indeed binding under all circumstances. But
the result demonstrates the importance of legal systems and of social pressures enforcing
the validity of contracts for the optimal working of societal processes.
The general proof of the theorem is, of course, rather complicated (for a relatively sim-
ple discussion see Mueller 2009: 32–34). In fact, contracts including up to n-issues may be
necessary to get stable Pareto-optimal outcomes. And this implies that transaction costs can
no longer be neglected because they generally will be greater the more issues and people are
involved. Indeed, this may have been an important historical reason for the development of
organizations (including political bodies and states). Or as Buchanan and Tullock (1962: 48)
expressed it in the Calculus: “We shall argue that, if the costs of organizing decisions vol-
untarily should be zero, all externalities would be eliminated by voluntary private behavior
of individuals regardless of the initial structure of property rights. . . . The choice between
voluntary action, individual or cooperative, and political action, which must be collective,
rests on the relative costs of organizing decisions. . .”.
The first sentence obviously refers to the Coase Theorem, and has not been proved by the
authors, but only in my papers mentioned above. However, their statement certainly opened
the right way of pursuit. My proof has the additional advantage of revealing that two more
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assumptions had to be introduced to generalize the Coase Theorem: First, if weak indi-
vidual preference orderings are present, that is, if individuals are indifferent among certain
outcomes, at least one issue has to refer to a good which is finely divisible and valued pos-
itively by all members of society. Second, if non-separable individual preference orderings
are present, it is necessary that the contract(s) include(s) several Pareto-optimal outcomes
occurring after each other with certain frequencies. This result implies that the partners con-
cluding the contract have to be guaranteed that their most preferred Pareto-optimal outcome
will favor them with a given regularity. Thus a distribution of benefits among the partners is
taken into account in the contract.
It is interesting to note that binding contracts are especially missing in the sphere of
politics. This means that stability is present only in repetitive games played, for instance, in
parliaments like the US Senate, where members remain in office with a certain probability as
potential participants in future agreements (Bernholz 1978). But in this field, too, interesting
scientific developments have taken place during the last years. My former student, Hans
Gersbach of ETH Zürich, has developed several approaches to how politicians could be
bound by binding contracts leading to better political results (Gersbach 2005, 2008).
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